People are objectified when they are treated as a means to a goal. The most common example is when women are sexually objectified and reduced to their physical appearance, sexuality, or individual body parts. In such instances, people are used in the same way as objects and are evaluated according to their instrumentality to the others' goals. The aim of this paper is to gain a better understanding of objectification. We will (a) outline basic principles of meansgoal relations during goal pursuit, (b) review research in which people are means to goals, (c) explain objectification according to a means-goal psychology in which people serve as means to goals, and (d) explain the implications of our account for the consequences of objectification. Specifically, we argue objectification is inevitable and that the consequences of objectification, including its morality, depend on the goal to which a person serves and whether the objectified person wants to serve that goal.
The term objectification is invoked when a person is treated as a means to a goal (Calogero, 2013; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Gervais, DiLillo, & McChargue, 2014; Goldenberg, 2013; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Nussbaum, 1998) . It implies that a person may be used, exploited, or manipulated. We present a new perspective on objectification derived from recent theory about the times people serve as means to others' goals (Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016) . This approach allows a new vantage point from which to answer important questions regarding objectification: Is treating a person as a means immoral or inevitable? Is it necessarily cold and callous, or can it also be warm and compassionate? When does objectification result in negative consequences? Should attempts be made to reduce objectification? While previous treatments of objectification paint a portrait of a sinister person objectifying another person while harming the other person as a result, we contribute a novel approach that states that the psychological process involved in objectification is inevitable and benign. Instead we focus on understanding when treating a person as a means to a goal leads to positive versus negative outcomes.
We begin by defining objectification. We then review psychological research on times in which people serve as means to goals. We next tackle questions regarding the implications of our approach for consequences of objectification. We point out that objectification can lead to both positive and negative outcomes, and offer suggestions for reducing the negative and increasing the positive consequences of treating people as means to goals.
Defining Objectification as Instrumentality-Driven Cognition
Objectification via instrumentality involves perceiving, defining, and evaluating a person based on his or her usefulness to the observer's goal(s). In other words, objectification occurs when a person is primarily regarded as a means through which a given goal can be attained by the perceiver. A person's instrumentality has been 691138P PSXXX10.1177/1745691617691138Orehek, WeaverlingObjectification and People as Means
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included as only one of many facets of objectification in various treatments (see Bartky, 1990; Dworkin, 1997; LeMoncheck, 1985; MacKinnon, 1987) and was most clearly articulated by Nussbaum (1998) as the essential element of objectification.
Nussbaum detailed seven processes by which a person may be objectified: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. Denial of autonomy involves treating the target as though he or she does not have selfdetermination. To treat a person as inert is to deny a person agency. A person is treated as fungible when he or she is perceived as being interchangeable with other people or objects. Violability involves treating a person as though his or her personal boundaries lack integrity and may be breached. Ownership is to treat a person as though he or she may be bought, sold, or traded for/ with. Denial of subjectivity occurs when a person is treated as if his or her personal experiences and feelings may be disregarded or do not exist.
For each of the preceding processes, Nussbaum (1998) provided examples in which a person was clearly objectified on some of those factors but not others. The only factor that is present in all examples of objectification is perceiving and evaluating a person via his or her instrumentality toward some goal. Therefore, Nussbaum concluded that instrumentality is the true defining feature of objectification. Many researchers have followed suit, adopting instrumentality as the essential feature of objectification (see Calogero, 2013; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Gervais et al., 2014; Goldenberg, 2013; Gruenfeld et al., 2008) . Because of this, we apply psychological principles of means instrumentality to the understanding of interpersonal relationships to arrive at an understanding of objectification. We return to each of the seven components when we discuss implications of our approach.
The most common depiction of objectification is the treatment of women according to their sexuality while other characteristics are ignored or denied. This occurs when a woman is treated as a thing or animal instead of a person by divesting her of human characteristics such as her own mind, feelings, desires, moral standing, and thoughts. Sexual objectification reduces women to their appearance, body, or individual body parts, and these parts are separated from their mind and/or are thought to represent their entire self. This leads to a perception of women as interchangeable with others possessing the same physical characteristics and therefore as nonunique. Although objectification is most commonly considered in this instance, the term refers to any time a person is treated as a means to a goal, such as when a corporation treats employees as replaceable machinery.
Instrumentality of Means to Goals
An object is instrumental to a goal when it assists in achieving that goal (Atkinson, 1964; Lewin, 1948; Weiner, 1972) . Below we review research investigating determinants of perceived instrumentality, the influence of perceived instrumentality on means evaluation, and factors that determine whether a means is replaceable or nonunique. Then, we review research applying a means-goal analysis to times when people serve as instrumental means. Finally, we consider the implications of our understanding of means-goal relations for objectification.
Determinants of perceived instrumentality
Perceived instrumentality of a means is determined by the strength of the means-goal mental association (Orehek, Mauro, Kruglanski, & van der Bles, 2012; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; Zhang, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2007) . The means-goal connection can be strengthened by successful use of specific means to attain a goal (Custers, Eitam, & Bargh, 2012; Danner, Aarts, & de Vries, 2007) . For individuals who typically cycle as a means of transportation, reminders of a transportation goal (vs. control) bring to mind the means of riding a bicycle (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) . For individuals who typically consume alcohol in social situations, a socialization goal (vs. control) brings to mind drinking alcohol (Sheeran et al., 2005) . Thus, the strength of the connection between a means and a goal is determined by the frequency with which they co-occur and the usefulness of the means for obtaining the goal (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2002) .
Coactivation of means and goals: "Thinking is for doing"
Many goals are pursued over time (Orehek & VazeouNieuwenhuis, 2013) . When a goal is being pursued, the ways and means of obtaining the goal are brought to mind (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Custers et al., 2012; Danner et al., 2007; Sheeran et al., 2005) and capture one's attention (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; Moskowitz, 2002) . The availability of means can also bring to mind the goal to which the means is instrumental (Shah, 2005; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003) . This allows individuals to take advantage of opportunities by being sensitive to moments in which a goal is likely to be attained (Shah, Hall, & Leander, 2009 ). Thoughts about activities disruptive to a goal are inhibited when it is being pursued (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; . Thoughts about means and goals covary such that each is brought to mind while the actor is attempting to make progress on them, both are deactivated or inhibited when not being pursued (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009; Fitzsimons, Friesen, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009; Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Liberman & Förster, 2000; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Zeigarnik, 1927) .
Thus, it seems that the turn of phrase "thinking is for doing" (Fiske, 1992) has proven apt. In other words, the goals of the moment direct attention toward goal-relevant thoughts, and determine how means are perceived. Research has extended this principle to thinking about people. Initiation of academic achievement or sociability goal pursuit led participants to bring to mind others who are helpful toward the goal (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008) . Thinking about or being in the presence of a specific person leads to the activation of the goals to which the person is instrumental (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a Shah, , 2003b .
Evaluation of means according to perceived instrumentality: "Liking is for doing"
To successfully orient oneself during goal pursuit, the actor must evaluate potential means of goal attainment with respect to their instrumentality to current goals. As has been pointed out, "liking is for doing" (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) . In other words, objects are evaluated positively or negatively depending on whether they are instrumental to current goals (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Constantinople, 1967; Feldman, 1973; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kopetz & Orehek, 2015; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Mitchell & Knudsen, 1973; Orehek & VazeouNieuwenhuis, 2016) . For example, if a person has a goal of satisfying his hunger, he will find food momentarily valuable. If the person is not hungry, food will be perceived as noninstrumental to current pursuits: "food has zero incentive value to a completely sated organism" (Atkinson, 1964, p. 283) .
Evaluation of objects should shift in accordance with the goal being pursued. That is, a particular object could be viewed quite positively at one moment, but quite negatively a little while later because the actor's goals have changed. As one's goals change, the evaluations of objects in the environment do indeed seem to change accordingly (Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Cabanac, 1971; Lazarus, 1991; Lewin, 1926 Lewin, , 1935a Loewenstein, 1996; Markman & Brendl, 2000; Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson & Chassin, 2003) . People evaluate objects more positively when the object is instrumental to a current goal as compared to objects that were instrumental to an already completed goal (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) . People also feel good while pursuing means attached to a current goal. For example, people with a food enjoyment goal feel better when eating tasty but unhealthy items (e.g., hamburger and fries) than those in a weight-watching goal (Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004) .
Means that do not align with current goals may be viewed negatively if they interfere with the goal or may be devalued if they are irrelevant to the goal. For example, smokers who had a current goal of smoking were less willing to pay for a raffle entry to win money as compared to smokers who did not have an active smoking goal (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003 ; see also Markman & Brendl, 2000) . The smokers devalued the raffle ticket because it was not instrumental to their current goal of smoking. In another study, participants negatively evaluated objects that were inconsistent with or interfered with an active goal, such as social activities while pursuing an academic achievement goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010) . Individuals exhibit a tendency to approach goalrelated objects and to avoid goal-disrupting objects (Fishbach & Shah, 2006) .
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that means instrumental to a currently pursued (vs. not) goal are evaluated more positively (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) and people feel better when using them (e.g., Fishbach et al., 2004) . Moreover, means irrelevant (Brendl et al., 2003) or inconsistent with (Zhang et al., 2007) current goals are devalued. In the next section, we consider the implications of these means-goal principles for situations in which people serve as means.
Objectification: Evaluating People as Instrumental Means to Goals
A growing body of research has investigated the way people rely on instrumental others to accomplish their personal goals (Feeney, 2004; Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2010 Fitzsimons, Finkel, & vanDellen, 2015) . When people facilitate goal pursuit, they can be considered instrumental means to accomplishment of the goal (Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016) . As such, people are evaluated according to their usefulness in aiding goal pursuit. Such a perspective has allowed researchers to apply the principles of means-goal relations to the study of evaluation of people. Below we review relevant research.
If evaluation of people follows the same principles as the evaluation of means more generally, then instrumental others should be evaluated more positively than noninstrumental others. To test this possibility, participants were asked to name a friend who helps them accomplish their academic achievement goal and a friend who does not help them accomplish that goal (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008, Study 2) . Half the participants then completed a procedure that primed them with an achievement goal. All participants then completed measures of perceived closeness to both the instrumental and noninstrumental friends. Participants primed with the achievement goal rated their instrumental friend as being closer to them than their noninstrumental friend, while participants who were not primed did not rate their instrumental and noninstrumental friends differently. Evaluations of others also change as the active goal of the participants shifted (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008, Study 5) . Participants evaluated others multiple times as different goals were primed. Evaluations of people tracked the activation of goals. When a goal to which a person was instrumental was primed, he or she was evaluated more positively than when a goal to which he or she was not instrumental was primed.
Another set of studies again found that evaluations of others track goal activation (Fitzsimons & Fishbach, 2010) . For example, in Study 1 students listed an instrumental friend and a noninstrumental friend to their academic achievement goal. They then induced participants to feel as if they had made high or low progress on their goal by directing their attention to either progress already made or to what must still be done to achieve the goal. When progress was low and participants felt that there was still much to be done to achieve the goal, they rated their instrumental other more positively than a noninstrumental other. However, when progress was high and participants felt that not much more was needed to complete the goal, the evaluation bias in favor of an instrumental other was eliminated.
Goal progress and perceptions of instrumentality also affect feelings of gratitude toward a helping partner. Participants reported more gratitude for a helper when the task was still in progress compared to when the task had been completed (Converse & Fishbach, 2012) . This was true when the participants were reporting their gratitude for a current helper compared to a past helper and when they were reporting gratitude for a current helper over the course of a task that was completed during the experimental session. Moreover, the perceived instrumentality of the helper mediated the relationship between goal progress and gratitude.
Researchers have also investigated whether participants would evaluate others on the basis of their instrumentality toward a dating goal. To activate a dating goal, participants were randomly assigned to read a passage imagining themselves on a romantic date with a desirable partner or to read a passage about the interior of a building (control condition). Participants then evaluated an actress at different life stages. Those with a dating goal devalued the actress at nonfertile life stages (i.e., toddler, older adult) relative to the control condition (Huang & Bargh, 2008 , Study 1). Thus, potential romantic partners who are instrumental means to dating (i.e., a partner in peak life stages) were evaluated more positively than others noninstrumental to a dating goal when that goal was active.
Taken together, this research shows that when a person is pursuing a goal, he or she evaluates others according to their instrumentality in achieving the goal. This conclusion has important implications for considering whether objectification is immoral and/or inevitable, and what approach should be taken to reducing the potential negative consequences of being objectified.
Consequences of Treating People as Means
Objectification has been linked to numerous negative outcomes for the person being objectified, including reduced self-esteem, shame, guilt, reduced sexual pleasure, depression, and feelings of worthlessness (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) . A woman's continual awareness of being evaluated via the instrumentality of her appearance may cause her to self-objectify (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) . This self-objectification manifests as a preoccupation with one's appearance and engagement in constant body surveillance. In other words, women can become rigid and obsessive in thinking of their appearance as the most instrumental means to achieving any and all goals.
The problematic aspects of objectification have led many scholars to forcefully declare objectification to be immoral. For example, "The instrumental treatment of human beings . . . is always morally problematic" (Nussbaum, 1998) . The roots of this moral judgment can be found in philosophers such as Kant. In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785 Morals ( /1998 , Kant presents a Formula of Humanity which asserts, "man . . . exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means." According to Kant, unlike objects, which have subjective value and a price, people have intrinsic value because they are irreplaceable. Skill and effort directed toward work have market value; wit, imagination, and humor have luxury value. Humans also possess reason, which allows for promise-keeping and benevolence, which grants them intrinsic value. This foundation leads to the categorical imperative that one should never, under any circumstance, use a human as merely a means. To do so violates the dignity of that person: that he or she is intrinsically valuable and has no equivalent. He further asserts that the value of humans does not lie in their instrumentality, but only through their willful intentions. For Kant, it follows that humans can be and should be appreciated with dignity irrespective of the extent to which the perceiver likes or is attracted to them. Marx's (1857 Marx's ( -1858 Marx's ( /1964 ) criticism of capitalism's reduction of workers to their work qualities rests on the same assumptions. The worker in a capitalist system is a means to production and his or her labor is bestowed with value. Just as Kant argued that the reduction of people to the market value associated with their labor undermines their intrinsic value, Marx observed that capitalism requires that the relationship between owner and worker be based in the worker existing "as someone else's property; in a word, a relation to them as capital." In other words, workers generate wealth for owners through their labor, and this market value is their only value. Workers are unable to confront injustice relating to their dignity from a position in which they are merely a means. According to Marx, capitalism fundamentally alters human economic relationships such that "the worker finds the objective condition of his labor as something separate from him, as capital . . . the capitalist finds the worker propertyless, as abstract laborers." For Marx, this is immoral because profit rests on an individual's ability to exploit the value of others, such that the worker receives less than his or her value.
An alternative approach has also been offered. Sartre's (1956) Being and Nothingness contends that, fundamentally, interpersonal interaction consists of mutual "possession" in which each person seeks to enslave the other (p. 364). Furthermore, he states that one's "being-as-object is the only possible relation between" the self and others (p. 365). At this point an individual begins to identify completely with his "being-looked-at" (p. 365), a concept very much akin to the understanding of self-objectification. Sartre describes the dynamic of romantic relationships such that a lover consents to be an object but also wants to be a specific kind of object: "a this which includes all other thises" (p. 367). In other words, while still being an object, "the lover wishes to be chosen as an end" (p. 368) and not simply a means among means (p. 376). Functionally, in a romantic relationship each person is an object that serves as a means to the other's goal of being an end. But the lover does not want to only be an end; he wants to be the unsurpassable and absolute end because in this way he is saved from being a mere instrument. Avoiding this instrumentality is how one preserves one's freedom, independence, potential, and value (p. 369). In reality however, people perceive one another as one among many others: as objects (p. 371). Therefore, the best a person can hope to do is to seduce someone by presenting himself as a fascinating and meaningful object (p. 372). It is with this realization that an individual will "engage . . . wholly in [his] being-as-object" and "refuse to be anything more than an object . . . an instrument to be used" (p. 378). In this sense, Sartre agrees with Kant and Marx regarding the definition of objectification, and with the value placed on being nonreplaceable, but suggests that objectification is inevitable (rather than immoral).
Implications of the Present Perspective for Consequences of Objectification
Recent research and theorizing has applied principles from the study of goal pursuit to cases in which people serve as means to goals (Converse & Fishbach, 2012; Fitzsimons & Fishbach, 2010; Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008; Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016) . In light of this new perspective, it is important to address the questions raised regarding the consequences of objectification.
Is objectification immoral or inevitable?
Previous writers were split on the answer to this question. Several influential authors declared objectification immoral in all instances (e.g., Kant, Marx, and Nussbaum). Some authors were more inclined to assume that objectification is inevitable (e.g., Sartre). Psychological theorizing supports the inevitability assumption. Theories of human perception, evaluation, goal pursuit, and memory do not distinguish between the way objects and people are mentally represented. Instead, they assume that people and objects are treated equivalently in the perceptual, memory, and evaluative systems. For example, theories about cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957 (Festinger, , 1962 Heider, 1946 Heider, , 1958 , memory and decision making (Anderson et al., 2004; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Hintzman, 1984) , human judgment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) , knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985) , and goal pursuit (Kruglanski et al., 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2002) all assume that people and objects are mentally represented in the same way and according to the same principles. Relationship researchers have also suggested that people think about objects in much the same way they think about people (Lakey & Orehek, 2011; Orehek & Forest, 2016) . This body of psychological theory, in combination with the research reviewed above, suggests that objectification is inevitable. Human minds evaluate other people according to their perceived instrumentality to goals (Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016) .
We argue that the psychological process that produces objectification is neither moral nor immoral. Evaluating others according to their perceived instrumentality is neither good or bad, right or wrong, ethical or dubious. Instead, the determination of morality depends on the content of the goal to which a person is evaluated, not the process by which the evaluation occurs. Objectification itself cannot be immoral because it describes an inevitable psychological process of evaluation. To suggest that people should not be objectified is to say that they should not be evaluated.
Yet, a person may find a particular instance of objectification to be moral or immoral based on two considerations. First, a person can be judged immoral for objectifying someone with respect to his or her instrumentality toward a goal the perceiver has judged as immoral. For example, a perceiver may consider objectifying a person as a pornographic actor immoral because he or she believes that it is wrong to distribute pornography. A second way objectification may be deemed immoral is if the person being evaluated is judged according to his or her instrumentality toward a goal to which he or she does not want to be instrumental. For example, a person who is evaluated according to his or her physical appearance or sexuality who wishes not to be evaluated on those grounds may be an immoral form of objectification. Thus, judgments of the morality of objectification must be considered according to the specific case at hand, the values of the person doing the judging and the expectations of the person being objectified.
Is objectification callous and cold?
A related question concerns whether evaluation of people according to their instrumentality toward one's goals is necessarily cold and callous. Indeed, notions of using people for one's personal gain, exploiting people for the value they bring, or winning an exchange of services for payment can certainly be cold and callous. However, it need not be the case. One determinant of whether objectification is cold or warm, callous or compassionate, is the goal to which a person is instrumental. If a person is instrumental toward the goal of being loved, to have a caring relationship, to establish a strong social bond, to have supportive others to rely on, with whom to laugh, and so on, then objectification can be quite warm (cf. Orehek & Forest, 2016) . Thus, just as the morality of objectification hinges on goal contents, so too does the callousness of its application. As with the morality of objectification, the second consideration is whether the person wants to be instrumental toward the other's goal. If the person does not want to serve as a means to that goal, then the person is being used in a cold and callous manner. If instead, the person would like to serve as a means to the other's goals, then the relationship is likely to be marked by warmth and compassion.
Do people dislike being objectified?
People differ in the goals to which they want to be instrumental and whether they are comfortable being evaluated according to their instrumentality toward each of them. For example, John may think he is quite skilled at certain sexual acts and may enjoy it when his wife commends him on his sexual prowess. However, Steve may not like performing similar acts and may feel uncomfortable when praised for completing them. Similarly, one woman may feel flattered and happy when praised for her beauty, while another may feel offended or uncomfortable that her beauty was her quality that attracted attention. Several of the subcomponents of objectification outlined by Nussbaum (1998) can be understood according to the (mis)match between a perceiver's goals and the target's desire to be evaluated according to his or her instrumentality on those grounds. Beyond instrumentality, Nussbaum (1998) included denial of autonomy, inertness, violability, denial of subjectivity, fungibility, and ownership as features of objectification. We consider each of these in the foregoing sections.
Kant defined dignity as acknowledgment that a person is unique and does not have an equivalent. The dictionary defines dignity as "the quality of being worthy of honor or respect." According to the Belmont Report, to treat a person with respect, "individuals should be treated as autonomous agents" (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978) . Denial of autonomy involves treating the target as though he or she does not have selfdetermination. To treat a person as inert is to deny a person agency. Thus, to grant a person autonomy, respect, dignity, and to avoid treating him or her as inert is to provide the person with a choice regarding whether or not he or she is used for a particular purpose or evaluated according to his or her instrumentality to a particular goal. Therefore, people are disrespected, denied autonomy, and treated as inert when they are treated as if they do not have alternative courses of action, or do not have a choice in the goal dimensions by which they will be evaluated. The same conditions foster violability, which involves treating a person as though his or her personal boundaries lack integrity and may be breached, and denial of subjectivity, which occurs when a person is treated as if his or her personal experiences and feelings may be disregarded or do not exist. These principles, taken together, underscore the importance of considering both the expectations of the perceiver and the expectations of the target.
For example, a physician who wants to be evaluated according to his or her medical knowledge and procedural skills, but is instead evaluated according to his or her sexuality and expected to be responsive to sexual advances, would be denied respect, dignity, and autonomy. If that same physician would like to be perceived as instrumental to his or her spouse's sexual goals, then being evaluated as attractive, arousing, and sexy would be welcome, respectful, dignifying, and would help maintain his or her autonomy. Indeed, people often want to be considered instrumental to another person's goals. In the context of caring relationships, people strive to be instrumental to their partners and experience positive feelings of social connection (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2012) , self-esteem (Piferi & Lawler, 2006) , and self-worth (Gruenewald, Liao, & Seeman, 2012) when they are able to be instrumental (Inagaki & Orehek, 2017) . In addition, when they fail to be instrumental, people can feel decreased positive affect (Williamson, Clark, Pegalis, & Behan, 1996) . People evaluate their own self-worth according to the notion that they are valuable to the people in their social network (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) . Thus, whether people want or like to be objectified depends on the goal to which they are expected to be instrumental. If it is a goal that they strive to be skilled in accomplishing and one that is part of their self-identity, then they are likely to welcome the objectification, but will not welcome objectification on dimensions for which they do not wish to be instrumental, even if the evaluations are positive (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult, Finkel, & Kumashiro, 2009; Swann, 2011) .
The reductionist problem
A related concern among those who are objectified is the feeling that they are replaceable, nonunique, or reduced to their individual features. A person is treated as fungible when he or she is perceived as interchangeable with other people or objects. This is similar to Kant's notion that people should not be reduced to their constituent features and that each person is unique. Objectification of a person suggests that a person is substitutable with any person who is also capable of serving as an instrumental means to the goal(s) he or she facilitates (Orehek & Forest, 2016) . Indeed, people may be substitutable for one another, such as when a new employee is hired to replace a former person in the role, or when a new romantic partner replaces a former partner. The new person is never identical to the previous person, but may be similar with respect to his or her instrumentality to a particular set of goals. However, people become irreplaceable or unique by either serving as a unique means to a particular goal or by being instrumental to a constellation of goals that would be difficult to find in another person (Finkel, Hui, Carswell, & Larson, 2014; Light & Fitzsimons, 2014; Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016) . Another way to foster a sense of uniqueness is to draw close to the people so that they appreciate the uniqueness of the bond they share (Lakey & Orehek, 2011) .
A consequence of reducing people to their individual parts is that they may be treated as an object that can be owned. Ownership is to treat a person as though he or she may be bought, sold, or traded for/with. For Marx, the payment of employees for their labor connoted ownership. An extreme example occurs when a person is sold into slavery. Less extreme forms occur when a person's individual autonomy is reduced, such as when a professional athlete is traded for another player. This situation may be coercive, and the objectification can be augmented by common references to athletes as "assets" with "trade value" (e.g., Simmons, 2015) owned by teams and traded for one another.
The psychological ownership of means can be a byproduct of the psychology of goal pursuit. Once a person becomes committed to achieving a particular end state, "motivational readiness morphs into a goal that the individual 'owns.' Indeed in every parlance, the goal concept implies commitment and ownership: It is your goal, my goal, or their goal, we commonly say, highlighting the possession aspect of goals" (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014, p. 371, italics original) . People express ownership of people in the same way. The concept of close relationships implies commitment and ownership. Another person may be your child, my child, or their child; your spouse, my spouse, or their spouse. Valentine's Day cards read "You're Mine" or "Be Mine." Sartre wrote of relationships as mutual possession. Such ownership has potential benefits such as a sense of social connection, belonging, interdependence, and cooperation. It can increase the sense that the other person can be relied on and trusted. However, it can also feel controlling, dependent, or restricting. Whether ownership feels right to the person being objectified rests on whether it is consensual and reciprocal. If a person wishes to be connected to another person, employer, or group, and the commitment is reciprocal, then they are likely to experience the upsides of such a partnership. If, however, the arrangement is nonconsensual or nonreciprocal, then the downsides are likely to predominate.
Relationships as goals rather than people as means?
Beyond merely serving as means to goals, maintaining a relationship with another person can become a goal. Means serve goals, which may themselves be subgoals to more abstract goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Scholer & Higgins, 2011) . Thus, maintaining a close relationship with a partner can become a subgoal. The relationship can serve various goals, and also be served by means to facilitate its pursuit. People serve as means to everyday tangible goals such as finishing a work assignment, long-term selfactualization motives such as striving to be more compassionate, and basic needs such as social connection and physical safety. When commitment to a relationship partner is high, maintaining the relationship becomes a subgoal that is served by a variety of behaviors such as providing care and support (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2012; Koo & Fishbach, 2016; Lakey & Orehek, 2011) , facilitating personal striving (Fitzsimons et al., 2015; Rusbult et al., 2009) , and engaging in exciting activities (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000) . Just as people inhibit thoughts about alternative goals while pursuing a focal goal , people protect relationships to which they are committed by derogating, devaluing, and inhibiting thoughts about potential alternative partners (Gillath, Mikulincer, Birnbaum, & Shaver, 2008; Linardatos & Lydon, 2011; Lydon, Fitzsimons, & Naidoo, 2003; Lydon, Meana, Sepinwall, Richards, & Mayman, 1999; Maner, Gailliot, & Miller, 2009) .
Although it is important to recognize that people serve as both means and goals, this observation does not change the conclusions regarding objectification. A bicycle can serve as a means of transportation and exercise, so too can it become a goal to maintain and secure the bicycle. The fact that maintaining the bike has become a subgoal does not change the fact that it is evaluated according to its instrumentality to the goals it serves. The same is true of people. Even though maintaining a relationship with close others can become a subgoal, it does not change the fact that people are evaluated according to their perceived instrumentality to the goals they serve. In fact, relationship maintenance processes can be just as cold and callous as objectification itself. For example, Machiavelli (1513 Machiavelli ( /1992 ) outlined a series of coercive practices for relationship maintenance in his treatise, The Prince. Thus, considering a person as a goal in addition to the role as means, as Kant suggested, does not tip the moral balance. Treating a person as a goal or as a means can be either moral or immoral, cold or warm, callous or compassionate.
Should psychologists work to reduce objectification?
Authors who have focused on the negative outcomes of being objectified (e.g., Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Marx, 1857 Marx, -1858 Marx, /1964 Nussbaum, 1998) have prescribed a reduction in the incidence of objectification. The design and testing of intervention to reduce objectification are considered by many psychologists to be an important next step (e.g., Roberts & Waters, 2012) . We, too, would like to ameliorate the negative outcomes of objectification. However, rather than reducing objectification per se, we suggest that practitioners focus on adjusting the goals people expect others to serve. Objectification itself is inevitable, but expectations regarding the specific goals a person can be expected to serve are malleable. Whether the person wishes to serve as a means to those goals should serve as the guiding principle for attempts at reducing the negative consequences of objectification. For example, to reduce sexual objectification of women in workplace or educational settings, the focus should be shifted toward evaluating women according to their work-related skills and abilities and away from evaluating women based on their appearance. In other words, instead of suggesting that employees and students should not be evaluated according to their instrumentality, the suggestion is to ensure they are evaluated according to their instrumentality on appropriate dimensions. In addition, the prescription should not necessarily be to eliminate evaluation of women according to their instrumentality to sexual goals under all conditions, but instead to determine if and when they want to be objectified on those grounds (e.g., at specific moments in a romantic relationship).
In addition to being inevitable, recognizing and appreciating others' instrumentality can be good both for the perceiver and the target. People who show a stronger preference for instrumental others over noninstrumental others are more successful in their goal pursuits (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008) . In addition, people who appreciate helpful others are likely to draw closer to them, work harder to maintain those relationships, and communicate the recognition of their partner's helpfulness to the partner. This, in turn, should facilitate the partner's feelings of usefulness, self-worth, and social connection. Thus, evaluating relationships through their instrumentality can be a strategic path to goal achievement and can facilitate feelings of social connection and perceptions of supportiveness. Interventions aimed at increasing appreciation and recognition of a partner's instrumentality to goals the partner wants to serve could be used alone or in combination with interventions designed to reduce evaluation of people according to goals they do not want to serve.
Conclusion
Objectification involves perceiving and evaluating a person based on his or her instrumentality to a goal. Many writers have pointed to potential downsides of objectification and have deemed it immoral. For example, a woman who has entered medical school who would like to be evaluated by her peers and instructors according to her intellect has the expectancy that people in her academic environment will respect her academic goals. If, however, her intellect is ignored or denied while her physical appearance is attended to, the evaluators have violated her expectations. The medical student is likely to experience feelings of rejection, worthlessness, lowered self-esteem, and/or depressed mood because she was not valued in accord with her goal to be a competent student (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) . The present perspective differs from previous approaches by arguing that the negative consequences do not occur because the person was evaluated according to her instrumentality, but instead occur because she was evaluated according to her instrumentality to a goal to which she did not want to serve. If her supervisor had instead positively evaluated her in terms of her usefulness in the operating room, she would likely experience positive outcomes such as increased self-worth. Interpersonal evaluation is naturally based on a determination of a person's instrumentality to goals, making objectification inevitable. Thus, all manner of prosocial and antisocial behavior stems from the process of objectification. Rather than attempting to reduce objectification, we suggest that the morality of objectification depends on (a) the goal to which a person is expected to serve and (b) whether the person wishes to be instrumental toward that goal. Efforts to reduce the negative consequences of objectification should focus on these factors rather than reducing objectification per se.
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